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POINT I
THE JURY DID NOT FIND THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND
BRANDISHING COUNTS TO BE BASED UPON "DIFFERENT
CONDUCT." COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT
SEEKING TO DISMISS OR MERGE THE BRANDISHING COUNT.

The State is wedded to the proposition that the charges were based on
separate conduct. See, e.g., Br. Resp., 24. There is, however, no support for this in
the charging document. The Information in this case mentions no specific victim
in either the third degree felony Aggravated Assault (Dangerous Weapon) count or
the class A misdemeanor Threatening with or Using a Dangerous Weapon in a
•

Fight or Quarrel count. R.1-3. The Information is included in Addendum A. The
defendant was found guilty of both counts. R.166-167. The verdict forms are
included in Addendum C. No particular victim is mentioned in the verdict forms.
Neither is there any guidance from the jury instruction, R.199, Addendum B.
The State accurately states that the Aggravated Assault elements instruction

i)

specifically names Hugo Holguin as a victim. R.196. The Threatening elements
instruction, however, names no particular victim. R.199. So while, factually, it
may be true that Holguin was the primary victim of the Aggravated Assault charge,
the State's argument that such a verdict precludes a finding by the jury that those
same facts also formed the basis of the Threatening conviction is inaccurate.
The State seeks to limit the Threatening charge to the concept that it must be
based upon the same conduct as the Aggravated Assault in order to be subject to
1

dismissal or a lesser included offense. Br. Resp. 14-24. But the "more restrictive
standard," the "necessarily-included standard," is "limited to cases where the

•

prosecution requests the instruction." Br. Aplt., 16, citing State v. Baker, 671 P .2d
152, 156 (Utah 1983); State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, if12-13, 62 P.3d 444.
That did not occur and the defendant conceded that it is not a statutorily lesser
included offense, and should not be analyzed under that rubric. Br. Aplt. at 16.
The defendant concurs that, "The (threatening) offense requires proof that

•

the defendant drew or exhibited any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening
manner, and did not do so in necessary self-defense." State v. Phelps, 2005 UT
App 451, cited Br. Resp., 17. The State's further reference to State v. Cravens,
2000 UT App 344, 15 P.3d 635, Br. Resp., 17, is of little value and unhelpful.
There can be little dispute, under whatever view of the various versions of

•

the testimony of the witnesses, that Mr. Calvert's actions were part of a single
criminal episode. "A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for
all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; when the same act of
a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1).
2

•

In order for a charge to be deemed a lesser included offense, "there must be
(i)

some overlapping of the statutory elements of the offenses. If that overlapping
exists and the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative interpretations,
the trial court must give a lesser included offense instruction if any one of the
alternative interpretations provides both a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense."

ti>

State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 553-54 (Utah 1984).

That language applies

squarely to this case and is one reason that counsel should have moved to dismiss
or later merge the Threatening charge into the Aggravated Assault.

It is not

intended that a defendant be punished for both the greater and the lesser charge,
"when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish
€1

offenses which may be punished in different ways under different provisions . . ."
§ 76-1-402(1).
It is well established that, "acts are separate if they are not necessary to each

other or are sufficiently separated by time and space." Br. Resp., 17, citing State v.
Chukes, 2003 UT App 155,
~

,r 21, 71

P.3d 624, 629. Certainly, here, the incident

occurred within a brief period of time and all within the same space, Mr. Calvert's
home. To say the least the evidence was ambiguous, warranting the threatening
charge to be treated as a lesser included offense. Chukes and the cases it relies
upon support Calvert's argument. Br. Resp., 19. The State's reference to State v.
3

•
Roth, 2001 UT 103, 37 P.3d 1099, involving convictions of possession of
methamphetamine and operating a clandestine laboratory, is sufficiently attenuated

•

from the instant matter that it provides no guidance. Br. Resp., 19.
The State argues that there was a "clear break" in time between the offenses,
and that counsel did not argue that pointing the gun at Hugo was also the basis of

•

the Threatening charge. Br. Resp. 20. It is no surprise that defense counsel failed
in this regard, as he missed altogether the dismissal/lesser included/merger
argument which is made here on appeal.

Such a failure is the essence of

ineffective assistance of counsel.
Discussing the issue of multiplicity, State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71,
299 P .3d 625 and State v. Hattrich, 2013 UT App 177, ljf 33, 317 P .3d 433, cited by
the State, Br. Resp., 21, were discussed extensively in defendant's opening brief.
Br. Aplt., 19-21.

<i

The State's position, citing those cases as authority, is that

"multiplicity forbids the State from charging a single offense as multiple offenses that is, from charging multiple counts of the same offense. Br. Resp., 21. To that
the defendant reiterates that the statutes themselves must be analyzed to determine,
under the facts of the case, whether a charge is multiplicitous, specifically, "the
'course of conduct' as opposed to individual acts' is what is prohibited." There
can be "but one penalty," even though different statutes may be involved. Br.

4

•

Aplt., 20, citing Rasabout, Hattrick, as well as State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 554.
Br. Aplt., 19-21.
It is virtually impossible to second-guess what evidence the jury chose to
underpin its Threatening verdict. Utah R. Evid. Rule 606 states, inter alia, as
follows:
(b) During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment.
( 1) Prohibited testimony or other evidence. -- During an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred
during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that
juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes
concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not
receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on
these matters.
(2) Exceptions. -- A juror may testify about whether:
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention; or
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear
on any Juror.
As the State points out, there was a single criminal episode in which,
depending upon the witness, the Threatening charge could well have been founded
upon pointing of the gun at Hugo Holguin in the presence of others. Br. Resp., 22.
Indeed, it is as likely that was the case as any other scenario.

Consequently

counsel was remiss in failing to bring the multiplicity issue to the attention of the
court, so that the Threatening charge could either be clarified by instruction to the

5

jury, dismissed as multiplicitous, or a determination made as to whether to deem it
a lesser offense.
The fact that the State indicates there were "multiple variants." Agreed.
This fact simply supports the defendant's argument that the evidence was
sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the Threatening charge to be treated as a lesser
included offense. Br. Resp., 22, citing State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314
P.3d 1014. No attempt was made by counsel to capitalize on the single criminal
episode nature of the circumstances, let alone the other possible scenarios which
might have been argued. So it cannot be assumed that the court would not have
taken some action consistent with counsel's requests, depending upon the option
chosen. Inasmuch as the jury verdict cannot be impeached, Utah R. Evid. Rule
606, it is prudent to conclude not only that the jury based its verdicts on the same

(i

facts, but that, in any event, the Threatening charge was lesser or should have
merged under that doctrine.
The State's reliance on State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, ,r 28, 65 P.3d 648,
Br. Resp., 22-23, is also misplaced. Smith relied on State v. Oldroyd, supra, to
support a claim of plain error. In Oldroyd, it was held that the defendant's use of a
weapon could have constituted either aggravated assault or threatening with a
dangerous weapon and that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on this
lesser included offense, after the defendant requested such an instruction, was
6

•

reversible error. Id.,685 P.2d,

,r 29.

The problem for the State with Smith is that,

unlike the present matter, "Smith never requested such an instruction and
maintained his innocence throughout the trial."

,r

29.

But here, the State's

reference to an "all or nothing" defense, Br. Resp., 24 n.4, is inapposite as that was
not exploited by Calvert. He affirmatively contended that he did obtain and use a
gun. R.284:61-62.

Consequently, Smith is not of relevance.

The State's reason for its reference to Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40,

,r 222,

344 P.3d 581, Br. Resp., 24, is unclear. In the paragraph referenced, the Supreme
Court discusses the efficacy of the reasonable doubt instruction, having nothing to
do with the instant matter. It is not otherwise apparent what this case establishes.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently laid the matter of when a lesser
included offense instruction must be given:
Even if the statutory elements of a lesser included offense overlap
with those of the charged offense, "a defendant's right to a lesser
included offense instruction is limited by the evidence and only
justified where there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included
offense." In making that determination, trial courts must "view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant" and cannot
"weigh the evidence." Rather, "when the evidence is ambiguous and
therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and
conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists and the court must give
a lesser included offense instruction at the request of the defendant."
This standard assures that lesser-included-offense instructions serve
their intended purpose of safeguarding defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial without "allow[ing] the jury to return a compromise, or
other unwarranted verdict."
7

State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45,

,r 22, 349 P.3d 712,

720 (Sup.Ct.) (emphasis added;

internal citations omitted). Thus, for the reasons set forth herein, a lesser included
offense was appropriate in lieu of a second count (as well as a motion to merge).
For the reasons set forth in defendant's opening brief and above, counsel
was ineffective in failing to move to dismiss, delineate as a lesser included offense,
or merge the Threatening charge. The defendant was prejudiced by the failure.
POINT II
THE CONVICTION FOR THREATENING WITH A DANGEROUS
WEAPON MERGES WITH AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO MERGE AND THE
DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED.

'I

The State incorrectly asserts that merger can only occur in kidnapping or
detention situations such as described in State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P .2d

•

1243. Br. Resp., 25. This is inaccurate. The merger proposition was considered
and rejected, but for reasons not pertaining to its inherent applicability or because
it did not involve some form of detention, in a case involving burglary and
homicide. State v. Tillman, 750 P .2d 546, 568-72 (Utah 1987)( affirming the death
penalty); State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89,

~

61, 174 P.3d 628 ("an underlying felony

that constitutes the aggravating circumstance merges with the conviction for
aggravated murder pursuant to Utah Code section 76-5-202")(1n 2008 this statute
was amended to state, "(a) Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection
8

•

(1) or (2) that constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime of
aggravated murder." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(5)(a)&(b ). In any event the
State's premise, that merger can only be statutory or confined to detention cases, is

•

inaccurate. "We recognized, however, that "section 76-1-402 ... is not the only
basis for finding that one set of facts may give rise to a merger of two or more
separate crimes so as to preclude a multitude of convictions for essentially the

•

same conduct." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ~ 30, 128 P.3d 1179. As the Court stated
in Lee:
In other words, we recognized that, in some factual scenarios, crimes
may be so related that they must merge even though neither is a lesser
included offense of the other under section 76-1-402. Where two
crimes are defined narrowly enough that proof of one does not
constitute proof of the other, but broadly enough that both may arise
from the same facts, merger may be appropriate. Otherwise, a
criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct that amounts
to only one offense, a result contrary to protections against double
jeopardy in general, see State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, P22, 104 P.3d
1250, and the merger doctrine in particular, see State v. Lopez, 2004
UT App 410, P8, 103 P .3d 153 ("Courts apply the merger doctrine as
one means of alleviating the concern of double jeopardy that a
defendant should not be punished twice for the same crime.").
Id.,~31.

•

Thus,

the

State's position that

merger can

only apply

to

kidnapping/detention situations is completely erroneous.
The merger issue, both statutory and otherwise, is discussed at great length
in defendant's opening brief. See Br. Aplt. Point II, 23-27. Counsel's failure to
move to merge was ineffective and prejudicial, for which reversal and remand is

9

appropriate. Also, as noted, this Court, however, has authority to effectuate the
merger based upon Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e).

See State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32,,

~

9,232 P.3d 1008, 1011. Br. Aplt., 27.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 404(b).

•

As explained in defendant's opening brief, the extraneous bad act evidence
allowed by the trial had a little tendency to substantiate the facts of the case at
hand, and may simply have served to make the defendant look either weird, just a
bad neighbor, or both. "The police report indicated that on October 28, 2008, Mr.
Calvert called the police to report that he approached Little, told her to move, that
she pushed and punched him, but she was drunk and fell on the ground. Br. Aplt.
28; R.95. No gun was employed. Ms. "Little reported that he was taking pictures

•

of her house, that she went outside he yelled at her, calling her names and "made
threats at my life like always." Id. He then attacked her, pushing her and hitting
her twice in the head. Id." The charges never went to court and verifying which
neighbor was the accurate reporter of the facts as they actually occurred would be
an impossible task at the present time.

The evidence, being the only other

evidence not directly related to the instant offense, and therefore being likely to
assume an exaggerated importance, should not have been admitted. It is error to
admit evidence of which the only real value is to cause the jury to see Calvert as an
10

I)

odd man and perhaps a dangerous one. See United States v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700,
•

722 (7th Cir. 2009). Such evidence is "propensity" evidence which is improper.
Likewise, "a prior assault or battery conviction is immaterial to a self defense
claim in a separate incident except to suggest conformity," and therefore improper.

United States v. Commanche, 577 F .3d 1261, 1268 (10th Cir. 2009). The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals has also stated regarding such equivocal evidence,
If weak circumstantial evidence of prior bad acts is admitted under
Rule 404(b ), there is an inherent danger of prejudice to the defendant.
The government cannot conduct a mini-trial on acts the defendant was
never charged with under the guise of Rule 404(b). The particular
evidence at issue here may be relevant under Rule 401, but the
probative value of such precarious evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant under
Rule 403.

United States v. Temple, 862 F.2d 821, 824 (10th Cir. 1988). 1 The danger of the
Little evidence is very clear. It simply demonstrated an unsubstantiated scenario
showing "propensity" or "conformity," making him look odd, perhaps dangerous.
Recently the Utah Supreme Court Stated this about Utah R. Evid., Rule
404(b):
"Rule 404(b) allows evidence of prior bad acts for noncharacter
purposes, "such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident."
But the evidence "must clear several evidentiary hurdles before
1

e

As the State acknowledges, "Utah courts consider sources interpreting a similar
or identical federal rule as persuasive authority of the meaning of Utah's rule. See,
e.g., Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ,I25, 216 P.3d 944." Br. Resp.
at 33.
11

•
admission-rules 404(b ), 402, and 403." These requirements can be
distilled into a three-part test: the prior bad-act evidence ( 1) must be
"offered for a genuine, noncharacter purpose," (2) "must be relevant"
to that noncharacter purpose, and (3) the "probative value of the
evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." Additionally, as we recently clarified in State v. Lucero,
"matters of conditional relevance must also meet the preponderance of
the evidence standard under" rule 104(b). "

State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45,

,r 57, 349 P.3d 712, 731

•

citing State v. Lucero, 2014

UT 15, ,r 13,328 P.3d 841. Rule 104(b) states:
(b) Relevance that depends on a fact. -- When the relevance of
evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may
admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be
introduced later.
(c) Conducting a hearing so that the jury cannot hear it. -- The court
must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question so that the jury
cannot hear it if:
( 1) the hearing involves the admissibility of a confession;
(2) a defendant in a criminal case is a witness and so requests;
or
(3) justice so requires.
Utah R. Evid. Rule 104. Lucero is clear that, "evidence of prior bad acts must be
relevant and offered for a genuine, noncharacter purpose; furthermore, the
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. Lucero at

,r

13.

Further, "matters of conditional relevance

must also meet the preponderance of the evidence standard under Utah Rule of
Evidence 104(b). " Id.

12

•

In this case, given the inapplicability of the doctrine of chances, as discussed
•

m defendant's opening brief, Point III, and below, the particular isolated
extraneous offense evidence being relatively ordinary in the realm of human
affairs, and the requirement that the Court give appropriate consideration to the

~

factors set forth in State v. Shickles2, justice required that the court hold a hearing
outside the presence of the jury to appropriately scrutinize those factors. Contrary
•

to the State's assertion that courts no longer consider the Schick/es factors, "(T)he
court may consider a number of factors, including those the Supreme Court of
Utah identified in State v. Shick/es: the strength of the evidence as to the
commission of the other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of
time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of

•

alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury
to overmastering hostility." Lucero at ,I 3 l(the Supreme Court has subsequently
disavowed the "overmastering hostility" factor. See below).
The 403 test is traditionally treated under a burden shifting analysis. If the
evidence has no unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, or mislead, it is
presumably admissible. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah Sup.Ct.
1993 ). If, however, the evidence does have an unusual propensity to be unfairly
prejudicial, the evidence's potential for unfair prejudice is presumed to outweigh its

2

State v. Shick/es," 2014 UT 15, P 32,328 P.3d 841.
13

probativeness, and the burden is on the proponent to show that the evidence has
unusual probative value.

Id.

"We reverse the presumption in favor of

admissibility because these categories of evidence are "uniquely subject to being
used to distort the deliberative process and skew a trial's outcome." Id. (internal
citations omitted). Here, the evidence was obviously prejudicial, therefore the
burden shifted to the State to establish that its probative value outweighed the risk
of unfair prejudice. The State was and is unable to do that. Prejudice is defined

•

well as follows:
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when "it tends to have some adverse
effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that
justified its admission into evidence." United States v. Massino, 546
F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). If
the other acts tend to prove a fact not in issue or "to excite emotions
against the defendant," they create a prejudicial effect. United States
v. Figueroa, 618 F .2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980). The district court
abuses its discretion when it admits "other act" evidence with a high
possibility of jury misuse but with only slightly more probative value
than other evidence on the same issue. See McCall um, 584 F .3 d at
477.

United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50, 57 (2.d Cir. 2011).
The State accurately notes that in assessing the Rule 403 factors in isolation,
the Shick/es factors are not an appropriate measure.

In other words, State v.

Reece's statement that, "Weighing the probative value and potentially unfair
prejudicial effect of evidence involves a variety of considerations, including the
factors we identified in State v. Shick/es," id. ,r 69, is at least, in part, incorrect.
14

•

The Utah Supreme Court ruled that,
As we explained in State v. Lucero, albeit in a slightly different
context, "courts are bound by the text of rule 403, not the limited list
of considerations outlined in Shick/es." 2014 UT 15, P 32, 328 P.3d
841. Thus, the governing legal standard for evaluating whether
evidence satisfies rule 403 is the plain language of the rule, nothing
more and nothing less. And while the district court's adherence in this
case to the Shick/es factors is understandable given our prior
pronouncements on this subject, it nevertheless represents an
application of the wrong legal standard and, therefore, an abuse of
discretion.

State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, 12 (Sup.Ct.). Furthermore, the Cuttler Court wisely
noted, with respect to the standard previously used, "overmastering hostility," that
•

•

•

it was far too strong a standard,
Finally, it is inappropriate for a district court to ever consider whether
evidence will lead a jury to "overmastering hostility." The language of
rule 403 requires only that evidence not lead to unfair prejudice.
Overmastering hostility is both a stricter and looser metric by which
to judge evidence under rule 403. Evidence may lead to prejudice in
ways other than by rousing a jury to overmastering hostility. Also,
overmastering hostility is much stronger language than the "unfair"
language actually used in rule 403. Since the overmastering hostility
factor under Shick/es is at best judicial gloss and at worst a substitute
test for evidence's admissibility under rule 403, we now make clear
that it is inappropriate for a court to consider the overmastering
hostility factor in a rule 403 analysis.

State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ~ 20 (Sup.Ct.) (Emphasis added).
The question that must be answered is whether the extraneous offense
evidence is so probative as to outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice. Nevertheless,

•

the Shick/es factors have not been totally abandoned. "Again, this is not to say that
15

the Shick/es factors, taken individually, have no place in a rule 403 analysis."

Cuttler at ,I 19.
In the instant case, it is difficult to understand how the extraneous evidence
presented tended to show that in the instance for which Mr. Calvert was charged he
did or did not fabricate a story or that he did or did not act in self-defense.
Contrary to the State's position that it is a rarity, a prior altercation with a neighbor
is a great deal more common than "brides in bathtubs." See Br. Resp., 36, 38. 3
Likewise, the evidence cannot be justified on the basis that State v. Cuttler, 2015
UT 95 did away with the Shick/es factors. It did not. On the contrary the Supreme
Court specifically stated as follows:
With respect to the first assigned error-the use of the wrong legal
standard-rule 403 instructs courts to exclude evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence." While weighing the evidence under
this rule, courts may consider many factors, including some of those
we identified in Shick/es. However, as we noted in State v. Lucero, in
the context of rule 404(b), the Shick/es factors should not limit the

Ci

•

3

The State maintains that, "It is not often that one is falsely accused by one's
neighbors of assaults and threats over trivial matters." Counsel for the State has
no doubt been fortunate to have lived amongst highly evolved, civilized and
genteel neighbors. The fact of the matter is that its assertion is sheer nonsense.
Neighborhood disputes, often very heated, are extremely common. Defendant's
counsel has tried numerous neighborhood dispute cases over the years, including
disputes over water rights, boundaries, domestic, and many more mundane issues.
It is not uncommon for people to become extremely feverish and resentful over the
most trivial slight, to make extremely inflammatory threats, to resort to violence in
these cases, and to commit serious assaults. It is far from a unique circumstance.
16
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considerations of a court when making a determination of evidence's
admissibility under rule 403. 2014 UT 15, P 32, 328 P.3d 841.
Instead, courts are "bound by the text of rule 403," and it is
"unnecessary for courts to evaluate each and every [Shick/es] factor"
in every context. Id.
Cuttler at 118. The Shick/es factors are relevant and helpful in the vast majority of
cases, but they are not a substitute for the analysis required by Rule 403. Id. at 1
19 ("Again, this is not to say that the Shick/es factors, taken individually, have no
place in a rule 403 analysis."). The problem in Cuttler was similar to but also very
different from the problem in the instant matter. "Here, the district court relied
exclusively on the Shick/es factors when determining the admissibility of the
previous child molestation evidence under rule 403." Id. 121.
In the instant matter the court relied entirely upon the doctrine of chances.
As indicated in Appellant's opening brief, and by the complete lack of "brides in
the bathtub" uniqueness previously discussed, a single commonplace and isolated
instance, not by any means identical, simply cannot satisfy the doctrine of chances.
Under State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, 356 P.3d 173, the same four factors,
materiality, similarity, independence, and frequency are utilized to discern both the
•

relevance of the proposed bad acts evidence and to weigh the evidence's probative
value against its prejudicial effect.
Labrum, 2014 UT App 5,

,r

Lowther at 1 19 n.3, referencing State v.

28, 318 P.3d 1151 (explaining that for a rule 403

analysis in cases relying on the doctrine of chances, Verde displaces the Shick/es
17

factors, but also noting that one of the Shick/es factors involves weighing the
similarities in the evidence).
The Supreme Court defined the doctrine of chances as a theory of relevance
under which rule 404(b) "evidence of prior similar tragedies or accusations" may
be admitted to support an "inference that the chance of multiple similar
occurrences arising by coincidence is improbable" as well as "a conclusion that one
or some of the occurrences were not accidents or false accusations."

State v.

Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,r,r 50-51, 296 P.3d 67. In Lowther, three other women alleged

that Lowther had "raped them under similar circumstances: they had attended a
social gathering where they consumed alcohol; they went to sleep either drunk or
tipsy; and they awakened to find [Lowther] forcefully penetrating them." Lowther,
at ,r 2. Verde involved the State's introduction testimony of three men who claimed
that Verde had sexually assaulted them when they were eighteen years old. Verde
at ,r 3. These courts relied on the doctrine of chances to establish an "inference that
the chance of multiple similar occurrences arising by coincidence is improbable" as
well as that they were not accidents or false accusations. Verde at ,r,r 50-51. The
single extraneous incident in the instant matter fails to establish the necessary
factors: materiality, similarity, independence, and frequency.

The doctrine of

chances test used by the district court simply fails this test. Admission of this
evidence was an abuse of discretion. State v. Lowther at ,r 8. It was unreasonably
18

8

prejudicial as well.
~

Absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more

favorable outcome and confidence in the verdict is undermined. State v. Perea,
2013 UT 68, ,r 97, 322 P.3d 624, 646 (Sup.Ct.).
Finally, while the dismissal of the justice court case in Holladay Justice
Court, Case # 081000542, may not be a judgment on the merits, as having not been
"completely, fully, and fairly litigated," as required by State v. Sommerville, 2013

~

UT App 40,

,r 33,

297 P.3d 665, it is a reflection of the essential equivocal and

weak nature of the witness, who failed to participate in the prior litigation, and the
frailty of the evidence presented. See Holladay Justice Court docket, Addendum •
D. Its prejudicial effect was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. The
error was harmful and the case should be reversed.
~

POINTIV

@

CALVERT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM THAT THE JURY
MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO IMPROPER MATERIAL DURING
DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE THEY HAD ACCESS TO A PROSECUTION
LAPTOP TO LISTEN TO A 911 CALL IS WELL TAKEN.

This issue was thoroughly briefed in Point IV of the defendant's opening
brief. The defendant is satisfied that it is sufficiently responsive to the State's
argument that no further argument is required. The Court is referred to Point IV of
the defendant's opening brief.
CONCLUSION

19

For the foregoing reasons the defendant respectfully requests that this Court
reverse his convictions.

c e Bullen
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF RULE 24 COMPLIANCE
Appellant certifies pursuant to Rule 24(t)(l)(C) Utah R. App. P. that the foregoing

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Herschel Bullen, hereby certify that this --/.±day of April, 2016 I caused to be
hand-delivered an original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals
and a searchable pdf CD, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114;
and 2 copies along with a searchable pdf CD mailed, United States Postal Service,
postage prepaid to the following:
JOHN J. NIELSEN, Esq.
Attorney General's Office
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake Cit~~l-LJ4114
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
JENNIFER VALENCIA, Bar No. 8008
Deputy District Attorney
11 l E. BROADWAY, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
Telephone: (801 )363-7900

JUL 2 5 2012
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By _ _ _ _ _---==Deputy~'"""!ct;ic~

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

Screened by: JENNIFER VALENCIA
Assigned to: WEST JORDAN TO BE
ASSIGNED

vs.
DAO# 12014605

CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT
DOB: 09/04/1969
AKA: Jeff Burton
6656 South 5500 West
West Jordan, UT 84084
D.L.# 149605204
OTN 40492852
SO# 156710

ECR Status: Non-ECR
Initial Appearance: August 1, 2012 at 8:30 AM
Warrant/Release: Sportsman's Bail Bonds

NO ADDITIONAL WARRANT
OR SUMMONS REQUESTED

Defendant.

INFORMATION
Case No.

!~{9o(.o~39

The undersigned Detective C. Hahn - WEST JORDAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Agency Case No. 12H009833, upon a written affidavit states on information and belief that the
defendant, CHADLEY KEITH CAL VERT, committed the crime of:

STATE vs CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT
DAO# 12014605
Page2
COUNT I
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT F3 (DANGEROUS WEAPON), 76-5-103(1) UCA~ THIRD
DEGREE FELONY, as follows: That on or about July 16, 2012 at 6656 South 5500 West, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did commit assault as defined in Utah Code
Section 76-5-102 and used
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-601; or
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, with the use of a
dangerous weapon in the commission or furtherance of the crime.
COUNT2
THREATENING WITH OR USING DANGEROUS WEAPON IN A FIGHT OR QUARREL
(DANGEROUS WEAPON), 76-10-506 UCA, CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, as follows: That
on or about July 16, 2012 at 6674 South 5500 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
defendant did , in the presence of two or more persons, draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an
angry or threatening manner or unlavrfully use a dangerous weapon in any fight or quarrel when
such an act was not necessary for self defense or defense of another, with the use of a dangerous
weapon in the commission or furtherance of the crime.

THIS INFORMATION
WITNESSES:

rs

BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING

Detective C. Hahn, A.C., K.H., A.H., A.H, A.H., Hugo Holguin, Officer B. Jex, Officer
T. McBride, K.P., A.R., Officer D. Saunders, Yolanda Trujillo

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
Your declarant bases this Information upon the following:
The statement of Officer Jex, West Jordan Police Department that on July 16, 2012 he
responded to a man with a gun call at a location in Salt Lake County. That he spoke with the
defendant, CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT, who admitted to having a gun with a laser in his
garage and gave permission to retrieve it. That Officer McBride retrieved the gw1 from the
garage and it had one round in the chamber. That he collected witness statements from the
children and adults who were threatened with the gun.
The statement of A.C., age 13, that while he was walking with his friends at a location in
Salt Lake County, CALVERT got mad at him for walking on his propetty. That CALVERT
pulled out a gun and threatened to beat them up.
The statement of A. H., age 15, that while he imd his cousins were walking to get their
bikes, CALVERT was yelling at them, telling them to get out of here and screaming that he was
going to kick all of their "assess." That A.H. left to go get their parents and when he returned,
CALVERT had a bll.111 with a laser on it and was aiming it at his uncle, Hugo Holguin.

STATE vs CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT

DAO# 12014605
Page 3
The statement of Hugo Holguin, that he approached CAL VERT and asked him what was
going on. That CAL VERT was very mad and yelling at everyone. That CALVERT told
Holguin that he needed to shut up, go back to his house and mind his own business. That
CALVERT had a gun the whole time he was yelling and pointed it at Holguin.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-705 (2008) I

declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my belief and
knowledge.

-r--1!iJ~~"--.
.,.l;;:;...{.)~l_2-_
..
I

Executed on:___
j_4"--'\'--7

r

~
~St;-1.--r: q?~
c.
DB+eCTIVe

Declarant

Authorized for presentment and filing

SIM GILL, District A omey

•

HAHM
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Tab B

INSTRUCT.ION NO.

l

1,

Before you can convict the defendant, ,Chadley Keith Calvert, of the offense of
Threatening With or Usin~ a Dangerous Weapon in:afight or Quarrel, a~·charged in-Co.µnt Itof
I

the informdtion,.:you must find :from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable· doubt each and
th

'every one ~f 1;he followiQ.g elements of that offense, occurring on .or apo:ut the 16 d~y of July,

2012, in_.Sa)t Lake County,.State oflJtah;
i

1. '

That the .defendant, Chadley Keith Calvert was in the ·presence of two or more

p.eople~ and

2.

Drew or exhibited any dangerous weapon, to wit a handgun; :and

3.

.(~) Did so in an angry or threatening manner, .or (b) .unlawfully used the same in

any fight a~ quarrel

u: ~er-cm:e.fµl.consjder~tjon .of aU .ofthe evidence in this case, you are .con:vinced.:ofthe
truth;.of eadh and every·,one. of the foregoing elements beyond a . reasonable :doubt, ·then yeu must
find the defendant ·guilty of Threatening •with or Using a Dangerou~ ·Weapon in

.ij

Fight or

Quarrel;-~ .cb'A:ged ,in Count II of the -infonnation. .If, .on the other hand,. you are not ccmvinced
!

.

ibeyond a r~asonable: do.tibt-of any ·one or more of the foregoing elements,. then you must find. the
I

defendant ~ot ,guilty of.Count IL.

0000199

INSTRUCTION NO.

i

1-'t

i

l3.·efqre .you ·can convict the,defendant, Chadley Keith· Calvert, ofahe= crime -of Aggravated
Assault,. as-·lchargecl -in Count I ·of the infonnatior,i:, yo11 must find· fr.en~ an of.the evidence and
l

beyond a r;~asonable doubt, each' .and every one of the following elements .of that offense
i

'

.

occur;clng-0.~ or-·.b.~fore the 16.th d~y of Ju]y, 2012, fu SaltLake County, State ofUtah;
1.

I Thafthe . de~endant, Chadley Keith:Calvert committed.an act ofassatilt up.on H~go

•

H~~g~;--and
2.

That-such attempt or act was committed intentionally-or knowingly; and

3.

Tha:t.:the defendant used a dangerous weapon.

lf, :after ¢·areful consideration of all . of the·evidence in this case.,:..YOU are cpnvinced.ofthe
tr.uth of.each and every one of the foregoing ·e1ements beyond ·a reasonable doubt, then you must
ijn(l

~~ d.ef~nd~t,;gµilty
.of Aggravated As~ault- as charg~d.m Count 1 .(;)rthe inf.erro~tion.: It; on
!
.

the ·other-li~ci,: ye.tl .are not ·COil'.\t.inceci .beyond a ·reasonable doubt of ·any one 0i" more. :of .the
I

foregoing el~ments, then you must :fipd ·the defendapt no.t :guilty ef CoU1lt I.

0000196

~

Tab C

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

State of Utah,

VERDICT

Plaintiff,

COUNT 1

Case No.121400830

Chadley Keith Calvert,
Defendant

We, the jurors in the above case, unanimously find the defendant, Chadley
Keith Calvert:

./

Guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Aggravated Assault;
Not guilty of Aggravated Assault.

Dated this

_j__ day of

fY½L

. 2014.

~OY @....aye&_
Foreperson oft9.~Jury_
Filed

By

_s;J'.:l~~;:~~,'.:.

;i2014.

(IIi'.i~ItJ
0000166

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTt STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

State of Utah,

VERDICT

Plaintiff,

COUNT2

Case No. 121400830

Chadley Keith Calvert,
Defendant.

We, the jurors in the above case, unanimously find the defendant, Chadley
Keith Calvert:

_:L__

Guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Threatening with a Dangerous
We~pon in a Fight or Quarrel;
Not guilty of Threatening with a Dangerous Weapon in a Fight or
Quarrel.

Dated this _ _ day of

V"Yl AY

2014.

0000167
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Tab D

HOLLADAY JUSTICE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HOLLADAY CITY vs. CHADLEY K CALVERT
CASE NUMBER 081000542 Other Misdemeanor
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-102 - SIMPLE ASSAULT Class B Misdemeanor
Offense Date: October 26, 2008
Plea: November 26, 2008 Not Guilty
Disposition: February 02, 2009 Dismissed (w/o prej)
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
DANIEL BAY GIBBONS
PARTIES
Defendant - CHADLEY K CALVERT
Plaintiff -

HOLLADAY CITY

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: CHADLEY K CALVERT
Date of Birth: September 04, 1969
Law Enforcement Agency: SL SHERIFF/ UNIF PD
Prosecuting Agency: HOLLADAY CITY
Citation Number: 1169675
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
~

PROCEEDINGS
11-03-08 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on November 26, 2008 at 10:00 AM in
HOLLADAY COURT with Judge GIBBONS.
11-03-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 081000542 ID 2473360
ARRAIGNMENT is scheduled.
Date: 11/26/2008
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: HOLLADAY COURT
4580 SOUTH 2300 EAST
HOLLADAY, UT

84117

Before Judge: DANIEL BAY GIBBONS
11-03-08 Case filed
Printed: 04/11/16 15:03:38

Page 1

Page 1 of 3

CASE NUMBER 081000542 Other Misdemeanor
11-03-08 Judge DANIEL BAY GIBBONS assigned.
11-10-08 Note: CHADLEY K CALVERT called to verify court time and date
11-26-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on January 09, 2009 at 11:00 AM
in HOLLADAY COURT with Judge GIBBONS.
11-26-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment
Judge:

DANIEL BAY GIBBONS

PRESENT

Clerk:

clopez

Defendant
Defendant prose

ARRAIGNMENT

The Information is read.
Advised of rights and penalties.
The defendant is advised of right to counsel.
Defendant is arraigned.
The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an
enhancement to the penalties for a subsequent offense.
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 01/09/2009
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Location: HOLLADAY COURT
4580 SOUTH 2300 EAST

HOLLADAY, UT

84117

Before Judge: DANIEL BAY GIBBONS
01-09-09 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on February 06, 2009 at 10:00 AM in
HOLLADAY COURT with Judge GIBBONS.
01-09-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge:

DANIEL BAY GIBBONS

PRESENT
Clerk:

candicel

Prosecutor: LOPRESTO II, THOMAS V
Defendant
Defendant prose

Printed: 04/11/16 15:03:38
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•
CASE NUMBER 081000542 Other Misdemeanor
HEARING
Deft appeared and no resolution reached.
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 02/06/2009
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: HOLLADAY COURT
4580 SOUTH 2300 EAST
HOLLADAY, UT

84117

Before Judge: DANIEL BAY GIBBONS
01-26-09 Filed return: Subpoena;

Camille Little

Party Served: Jessica Martinez-Niece
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: January 21, 2009
01-26-09 Filed: information
01-26-09 Issued: Subpoena Deputy Child, Camille Little
Clerk candicel
Hearing Date: February 06, 2009
02-02-09 Charge 1

Time:

10:00

Disposition is Dismissed

02-06-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge:

DANIEL BAY GIBBONS

PRESENT
Clerk:

candicel

Prosecutor: MILLER, LORENZO K

•

Defendant
Defendant prose
Defendant's Attorney(s): MIKE LARENCE

HEARING

•

Companian case unpon motion from prosecution case dismissed.
02-09-09 Case Closed
Disposition Judge is DANIEL BAY GIBBONS
02-09-09 Charge 1

Disposition is Dismissed

Printed: 04/11/16 15:03:38
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